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INTRODUCTION
What do transactional lawyers do when they issue third-party opinion
letters in financial transactions? This descriptive question turns out to be
quite complex'-so complex that the normative question of what lawyers
should do when they issue opinions, as well as the practical question of
what they could do, are difficult to answer.
This Symposium Article reflects upon third-party closing opinions as a
central aspect of business law practice that can be opaque to outsiders. The
ideas expressed here are exploratory. In the spirit of reflecting on what
transactional lawyers do, this contribution considers deal lawyer strategies
as potential tools for advancing the interests of non-parties affected by
commercial transactions.
Many types of transactions call for opinions of counsel as a condition
precedent to closing.2 This Symposium Article focuses on certain types of
opinions to third parties-namely, closing opinions in commercial finance
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. Many thanks
to David Snyder and David Hunter for helpful feedback, and to the editors of the
Business Law Review for this Symposium.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 5-10.
2. See generally DONALD W. GLAZER ET AL., GLAZER & FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL
OPINIONS (2d ed. 2001 & Cum. Supp.); LEGAL OPINION LETTERS FORMBOOK (A.
Sidney Holderness, Jr. & Brooke Wunnicke eds., 3d ed. 2010); Thomas L. Ambro &
Arthur Norman Field, The Legal Opinion Risk Seminar Papers, 62 Bus. LAW. 397
(2007).
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transactions. These opinions assure investors that, among other things, the
transaction will be enforceable against the attorney's client at closing.
Attorneys commonly issue closing opinions to parties who have some
relationship to the transaction; these are the third parties who request and
receive opinions. But there are also other parties, with no relationship to
the deal and who are not named recipients of any opinion, who can
nonetheless take interest in the existence and forms of closing opinion
letters. Typical non-parties interested in closing opinions include rating
agents or accountants who assess transactions.4 After all, opinions signal
that a deal conforms to legal standards and should be priced and accounted
for as such.
This Symposium Article considers the scope of non-party interests in
opinion letters, exploring new kinds of interests in these letters that non-
parties could take. It presents-in a preliminary way-the possibility of
opinions practice as .a site for expressing social or environmental
commitments.
Transactional representation, among other things, effectuates private
ordering and governance. Deal lawyers translate the initiatives of market
actors into legally enforceable contracts and conveyances. Private ordering
involves commitment to industry social and environmental standards.6
Lawyers for corporations entering into transactions with social or
environmental consequences, then, participate in the implementation (or
not) of self-regulation or industry norms.
When a type of transaction affects non-parties-such as community or
environmental groups-these groups often express their interests by
pressuring transacting parties to adhere to their favored norms. These
outsiders tend to focus on corporate reputation, creating pressure on
companies to behave in accordance with the social and environmental
commitments that they express publicly, but may not always implement.
What transactional lawyers do can be opaque to outsiders. This can
result in lost opportunities for non-parties as they engage in strategic
behavior to enforce industry norms that are central to contemporary, private
governance.
For example, lawyers for non-governmental organizations ("NGOs")
concerned with the consequences of transactions could develop forms of
3. See Lipson, infra note 14, at 1203.
4. See id.
5. This Symposium Article does not intend to express any concrete proposals or
normative commitments; the ideas presented below are purely exploratory and would
require significant further trouble-shooting and research.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
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legal opinion. Organizations could demand of investors that they receive
certain forms of opinion as a way of ensuring compliance with the
organizations' standards. Failure to request or to obtain the opinion would
signal to non-parties that a deal may be adverse to their interests. This type
of exercise might enable interested non-parties to generate information
about transactions with a level of specificity that they currently lack.
Part I briefly describes closing opinions in financial transactions. Part II
describes non-party interests in closing opinions. Part III relates closing
opinions to concepts of private lawmaking and of new governance. Part IV
synthesizes the first three parts into a proposition that perhaps non-parties
with normative agendas could make strategic use of opinions. It presents
one sample context in which this idea could have traction: 'no violation of
law' opinions in project finance transactions in which the lender has
adopted the Equator Principles.'
Opinion letters are about deal details. Giving affected non-parties better
understanding of transactional lawyering strategies could enable them to
harness the power of specificity with respect to transactions with
significant environmental or community effects.
I. OPINION LETTERS IN FINANCE
Third-party closing opinions are letters that attorneys issue on behalf of
clients for the benefit of lenders or other parties to a transaction. A clean
opinion will assure parties to a transaction that the deal meets certain legal
criteria, including enforceability. A qualified opinion will identify legal
risks; a reasoned opinion will explain the lawyers' views on identified
issues.
Literature on opinions practice discusses third-party closing opinions' (i)
value to transactions,8 (ii) risk of liability for issuing attorneys,' or (iii)
scope and degree of qualification.10 Scholars discuss both economic and
non-economic reasons for opinions practice. In economic terms, these
letters can reduce information asymmetries or can function as a type of deal
insurance." In non-economic terms, some scholars say opinions persist
7. See infra note 40.
8. See generally Lipson, infra note 14.
9. See id. at 1203-04; see generally John P. Freeman, Symposium: Rethinking Legal
Opinion Letters: Current Trends in Legal Opinion Liability, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
235 (1989).
10. See generally DONALD W. GLAZER ET AL., supra note 2; LEGAL OPINION
LETTERS FORMBOOK, supra note 2; Kettering, infra note 17.
11. See, e.g., Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239, 290-91 (1984); cf Barnett, infra note 16.
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because of path dependency and conceptions of lawyers' professional roles
in transactions. 12
Many say that opinions are not cost-justified, and yet they endure as
routine features of transactions.13 Others observe that it is difficult to
determine when a closing opinion is cost-justified, because parties do not
know the value of the opinion until after the client incurs the costs of its
preparation. 14 If a letter reveals important information about a transaction,
it can be well worth its cost to the parties. If it does not, it may cost
considerably more than the information provided adds to the deal.15 Some
question the usefulness of opinions' signaling or certification capacity,
given that they are often highly qualified and difficult to interpret.16
Opinions can be so full of caveats and qualifications that their
effectiveness is questionable." The scope of exceptions to a legal opinion
is often subject to negotiation between the attorney issuing the opinion and
the opinion's beneficiaries. While some critics find a highly qualified
opinion to be of little value, others find that the uncertainty such an opinion
can convey is itself valuable information about a deal.18
12. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion
Practice Among US. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 59,
113-15 (2005); Jonathan Macey, The Limits of Legal Analysis: Using Externalities to
Explain Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REv. 75, 78 (2005).
13. See Bus. LAW SECTION, STATE BAR OF CAL., REPORT ON THIRD-PARTY
REMEDIES OPINIONs 2007 UPDATE (2007), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/
buslaw/tribar/materials/20120820000005.pdf.
14. Jonathon C. Lipson, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Third-Party Opinion Practice,
63 Bus. LAW. 1187, 1198 (2008) (presenting a qualitative empirical analysis of
whether and when closing opinions are justified by cost-benefit analyses).
15. See id.
16. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other
Transactional Curiosities, 33 J. CORP. L. 95, 102-03 (2007) (discussing the wide use of
closing opinions in corporate practice even where opinions contribute little
informational value).
17. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The
Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOzO L. REv. 1553, 1684 (2008)
(noting that opinion letters in securitization opinions can contain so many caveats that
they are virtually ineffectual); see also Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L.
REv. 1011, 1070 n.242, 1080 (2009) (referring to transactional lawyers' opinion letters
as attorney work product loaded with ad nauseum caveats).
18. Attorneys distinguish qualified opinions from "non-opinions"-opinions that
are so extensively qualified that they do not actually give the opinion they purport to
render. ABA Guidelines advise against issuing "non-opinion" letters in favor of more
explicitly expressing to the client and third party that the attorney cannot give the
requested opinion. See, e.g., The ABA Silverado Guidelines, II.C. (4) (1991)
(accompanying the 1991 Third-Party Legal Opinion Report and Accord).
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Opinions practice has resisted centralized best-practices or regulation. In
his qualitative empirical study, Jonathan Lipson finds that opinions practice
appears to resist market-based change, and that the main forces behind
changing practices are bar associations. 9 Even bar associations, though,
have not necessarily succeeded in establishing centrally-articulated
standards.20
II. RELATING NON-PARTY INTERESTS TO OPINIONS
Legal opinions serve a signaling function in markets. For example,
opinions are integral to the creation of asset-backed securities.2 1 In a
securitization, opinions assure investors that a company conveyed assets to
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) in a sale-not to secure debt-and that the
SPV is a legal entity distinct from the company such that it would not be
consolidated with the company in bankruptcy. Attorneys for securitization
originators issue opinion letters to investors, but accountants and rating
agents often rely on the letters as well. The securitization context generates
specific non-parties interested in specific forms of third-party opinion
letter.22
19. See Lipson, supra note 12, at 64. Practitioners involved with the American
Bar Association Opinion Committee observe that "business law practice has become
more national and even international in the years since Silverado"-the 1989
conference where the ABA Section of Business Law attempted (without success) to
garner institutional support for opinions standards. See Ambro & Field, supra note 2,
at 397-98. Therefore, "the consensus that malpractice insurers, financial institutions,
opinion recipient interests and rating agencies needed to agree as to customary practice
is relatively recent." Id. at 398.
20. See Ambro & Field, supra note 2, at 397-98. Various bar association
committee reports do address opinions practice. See, e.g., Ops. Comm., Cal. St. B.
Bus. L. Sec., Toward a National Legal Opinion Practice: The California Remedies
Opinion Report, 60 Bus. LAW. 907 (2005); TriBar Op. Comm., U.C.C. Security
Interest Opinions-Revised Article 9, 58:4 Bus. LAW. 1449 (2003).
21. See generally Kettering, supra note 17; Schwarcz, infra note 22.
22. Another group of non-parties potentially affected by securitization transaction
opinions are investors in originators. Steven Schwarcz has observed that opinion
letters can create negative externalities if they mislead investors in originators'
securities. This is a function of an information problem: attorneys issue opinions to
assure the bankruptcy remoteness of assets assigned to an SPV, as a legal matter, but
then accountants use them for purposes of accounting for transactions as off-balance
sheet sales. As Schwarcz observes, investors could learn about contingent recourse in
these transactions if they more closely read disclosure statements. Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1,
2, 4, 7 n.33 (2005). Schwarcz is concerned with the effects of off-balance-sheet
financing on investors, given investors' capacities to access and understand
information. But the government, not attorneys, he argues, should address the problem
that off-balance sheet financing can be opaque to investors.
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However, legal scholars writing about a range of transactional law
subjects suggest that non-parties have interests in closing opinions.23
These projects express concern for lawyers' professional responsibility
generally and for lawyers as gatekeepers in complex markets. 24  Non-
parties such as market participants, or parties affected by corporate
practices, have interests in third-party opinions in situations where those
opinions are supposed to serve a gatekeeping function.
For example, Susan Block-Lieb and Edward Janger write about the need
for effective gatekeeping in the market for mortgage-backed securities. 25
Lawyers issuing opinions are one form of gatekeeper in this market. To the
extent that the market relies upon the quality of gatekeepers, market
participants generally are non-parties with interests in the opinions that
lawyers issue upon analyzing the legal status of, and level of recourse in,
any given issuance.
Peter Margulies also discusses the importance of lawyers as
26gatekeepers. He writes that we should not frame lawyers' professional
responsibility and potential liability in terms of the independence that
lawyers enjoy. 27  Rather, the measure of lawyers' acceptable behavior
should fall between the opposing forces of (i) the lawyer's need to build an
individual brand and business, and (ii) the collective need for protection
from societal harms. 28 To the extent that rendering opinions is a crucial
aspect of lawyering, Margulies implies a general, non-party interest in
closing opinions to the extent that they sanction corporate practices that can
cause societal harms in the name of innovation or boundary-pushing.29
William H. Simon has written about the secrecy of opinions, explaining
that they are only revealed to the public when a client finds doing so to be
in its best interest.30 If lawyers shirk their professional responsibility in the
23. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 16; Schwarcz, supra note 22; Kettering, supra
note 17.
24. See Block-Lieb & Janger, infra note 25; Margulies, infra note 26.
25. See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Edward Janger, Demand-Side Gatekeepers
in the Market for Home Loans, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 465 (2009).
26. See Peter Margulies, Lawyers' Independence and Collective Illegality in
Government and Corporate Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58
RUTGERS L. REv. 939, 940-41, 947, 955 (2006); cf Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of
Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909 (2006) (discussing a
shift in professional responsibility standards from an ethics-oriented approach with a
sense of duty to the public, to a. risk management approach focused only on advance
clients' private interests and avoiding liability).
27. See Margulies, supra note 26, at 939, 940-41, 947, 955.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See William H. Simon, The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic
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context of opinions practice, we are none the wiser because beneficiaries
and clients have discretion to not disclose opinions. Regardless of whether
one thinks opinions should be publicly available, the point here is that
Simon articulates an interest of non-parties in opinions. 31 To the extent
that non-parties cannot see closing opinions, they have no way of knowing
the legal nuances of a deal.
This Symposium Article considers how and why certain other kinds of
non-parties might take interest in closing opinions. To think about
potential new kinds of interests that non-parties might take in opinions, the
next section relates opinions practice to private ordering and governance.
III. OPINION LETTERS AND GOVERNANCE
Transactional lawyers work at the heart of private ordering. They
translate market actors' normative goals and commitments into legally
binding agreements. Transactional lawyers draft the contracts that can
impose rules on others, or that can make broadly stated social commitments
into legal requirements. Opinions practice relates to the effectiveness and
effects of these agreements.
Legal scholars in recent years have studied private ordering and its
relationship to lawmaking. 32 Governance is not necessarily top-down by
the state, but also involves various modes of self-regulation-the private
creation and enforcement of norms.
Along with the study of private ordering, scholars are writing about
"new governance," studying the nature of lawmaking where power and
regulatory action emanate from multiple state and non-state sources.33 A
key concern of new governance is how to facilitate self-regulation and
diverse sources of power without devolving into a mode of de-regulation.3 4
Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1555, 1571
(2008).
31. Whether that interest deserves legal protection is a separate question. Some
may say that disclosure rules already govern the scope of information that companies
should provide, and that people should look to disclosures rather than opinions for
information about deals. Cf Schwarcz, supra note 22, at 4, 7 nn.33, 30-3 1.
32. See, e.g., David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (2003).
33. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012). Scholars can also
describe new governance scholarship in methodological terms; it brings together
empirical studies of regulation with normative scholarship about the role of the state.
Id.
34. Lobel, supra note 33, at 3; see also ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL
KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011) (building
on new governance veins of legal scholarship to explore legal techniques used by
private actors as a potential site of regulatory innovation).
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New governance scholarship certainly does not exclude from study the role
of the state in regulation; rather, it explores effective roles for the state
amidst the shift towards private governance efforts.35
"Private lawmaking" refers to contexts in which a private body or group
creates and imposes rules that govern many others.3 6 Classic examples of
private lawmaking include the activities of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"). NCCUSL, a private
body of experts, drafts form legislation-such as the Uniform Commercial
Code-that state legislatures adopt. 37 Some scholars contend that standard
form contracts themselves exemplify private lawmaking because the
contract drafter imposes, effectively, legal terms and conditions on a broad
class of people.
Investors often request standardized forms of opinion in a financial
transaction. A third-party beneficiary that requires the opinion will send its
requested form to the attorney issuing the opinion. But the attorney issuing
the opinion does not simply sign and return this form. Rather, the attorney
will perform the due diligence necessary to render the opinion, and then
consider the risk involved in issuing the opinion in the form the investor
requests. The attorney may respond with a new form or with comments
altering the investor's form. So, although initially forms of opinion may
appear standardized and routine, it is not unusual to find opinions, as
issued, bespoke.
It is beyond the scope of this Symposium Article's contribution to
consider whether opinion letters are "private lawmaking." Opinions are key
pieces of business transactions, and transactions express and implement
market actors' normative commitments. As such, opinions operate at the
heart of private ordering.
35. See Lobel, supra note 33.
36. See Snyder, supra note 32.
37. See generally Alan Schwartz, The Still Questionable Role of Private
Legislatures, 62 LA. L. REV. 1147 (2002); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The
Political Economy ofPrivate Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995).
38. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971). The hallmark of private lawmaking
is simply that private actors effectively impose rules on numerous others. A contract
between two market actors creates rules the parties can enforce against one another.
This is not private lawmaking-the rules of enforceability lie in state contract law-but
rather just two parties submitting to a legally enforceable arrangement. See generally
Snyder, supra note 32.
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IV. DEAL LAWYER STRATEGIES AND NORMATIVE COMMITMENTS
Given the power of private ordering, and the role of opinions in financial
transactions, to what extent is opinions practice a site for expressing
normative commitments? This Symposium Article considers the possible
private ordering potential of closing opinions.3 9
Non-parties with normative agendas could develop forms of opinion that
non-parties demand a deal include. Demanding the issuance of an opinion
could be a strategy to advance social goals or to improve effects of
transactions on natural resources. Failure to obtain certain forms of
opinion would provide information-potentially, quite specific
information-of interest to affected non-parties.
One context in which this could happen, for example, is the project
finance context. Leading international project lenders have engaged in
self-regulation by adopting industry standards known as the Equator
Principles. 40  Non-parties, such as NGOs representing the interests of
affected resources and populations, are concerned with enforcement of
these privately adopted norms.4 1 Opinions practice may provide an
opportunity to gain information about these transactions that is beneficial to
interested non-parties.
Clients may express norms, but then avoid enforcing them. The gap
between norms as expressed and actual levels of implementation can
emerge in deal documentation. Interested non-parties have no capacity to
negotiate contracts and do not have standing to sue if parties include norms
in contracts but then abandon them. Attorneys working with interested
non-parties may generate a market for a different kind of transactional
practice: one in which they develop independent forms, and review
industry forms, to affect the levels of implementation of norms that
commercial parties may publicly adopt but privately neglect.
39. I have previously related Riles' presentation of legal techniques and regulatory
possibilities to opinions practice in prior publication. See Heather Hughes, Derivatives
Traders Do What, Again?, 30 J.L. & COM. 203, 216-218 (2012) (reviewing RILES,
supra note 34, and raising the possibility of relating opinions practice in the
securitization context to systemic risk regulation).
40. The Equator Principles: A Financial Industry Benchmark for Determining,
Assessing and Managing Social & Environmental Risk in Project Financing, EQUATOR
PRINCIPLES (June 2013), http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator
principlesIll.pdf [hereinafter The Equator Principles]. Numerous major U.S. and
foreign lenders, such as Bank of America, ABN AMRO, and Wells Fargo, are Equator
Principles financial institutions.
41. See, e.g., ADAPTATION FUND, www.adaptation-fund.org (last visited Nov. 10,
2013); Equator Principles, BANKTRACK, www.banktrack.org/show/pages/equator
principles (last visited Dec. 24, 2013).
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Questions of transparency and access to legal documentation present a
challenge to this kind of strategy; transparency has been an issue of
ongoing concern to NGOs.42 While this Symposium Article has no quick
answer to this challenge, market conventions do contemplate disclosure of
certain features of deals to non-parties, such as rating agents. Non-parties
concerned with social and environmental impact could potentially achieve
an auditing function that becomes conventional in the project finance
market, and as such could gain access to transaction details not heretofore
contemplated, as other kinds of gatekeepers and auditors do.
Leading project financers recently announced their support for the
Equator Principles III ("EP III")-the third iteration of the project finance
industry's statement of commitment to improving environmental and social
impacts of international development projects.43 Many applaud when
banks become Equator Principles Financial Institutions ("EPFIs"), pledging
to fund only projects that meet heightened standards. Critics, however,
observe that EPFIs do not always require borrowers to comply with the
principles.4 Also, EPFIs have no obligation to exercise remedies when a
project falls out of compliance post-closing.45
Equator Principle 8 is titled "Covenants."4 6 It recognizes the importance
of incorporating EP III compliance into financing documentation between
EPFIs and project borrowers.4 7 Under Principle 8, EPFIs commit to
include covenants in financing documentation requiring the borrower to be
in compliance with the principles.48
The Equator Principles attempt to hold project borrowers to higher social
and environmental standards than local laws could require. The principles
cross-reference International Finance Corporation ("IFC") and other World
Bank requirements for projects in various industries.49
42. For example, BankTrack (an NGO) has followed and commented on the
development and implementation of the Equator Principles since the principles'
inception. BankTrack has targeted the transparency problem at multiple junctures.
See, e.g., Transparency and the Equator Principles: Proposals for EP Bank Disclosure
Working Document, BANKTRACK (Nov. 28, 2004), www.banktrack.org/manage/ems
files/download/transparency-forthe-equatorbanks/041128 transparency-forjthe-eq
uator banks.pdf.
43. See The Equator Principles, supra note 40.
44. See, e.g., Ariel Meyerstein, Global Private Regulation, Global Finance and
the Future of Corporate Human Rights Accountability (Mar. 9, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2018999.
45. See The Equator Principles, supra note 40, at 5-6.
46. See id. at 10.
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What is the relationship between Equator Principles compliance and
opinions practice? What form might an opinion from counsel to the project
borrower take if its function were to ensure the transaction's compliance
with EP III (which requires no violation of applicable environmental laws)?
What is the relationship between the fact-finding and auditing that assures
compliance, and a legal opinion about compliance?
Typically, a "no violation of law" opinion requires the issuing attorney
to state that the client will not violate laws by entering into the subject
transaction.50 In a project finance transaction, the issuing attorney's client
is the project entity-a company formed to own and run a specific project,
such as a dam, manufacturing facility, or utility, for example. The third-
party recipient of the opinion, again, is the project lender-a bank or
syndicate of banks. Many major project lenders are EPFIs. So, the "no
violation of law" opinion assures an EPFI that its borrower will not violate
the law by performing under the contracts that document their deal.
But consider the following, typical qualification to "no violation of law"
opinions:
[W]e express no opinion as to any statutory laws other than statutory
laws that lawyers in the State[s] of New York [and STATE] exercising
customary professional diligence would reasonably recognize as being
applicable to transactions of the type contemplated by the Credit
Documents, assuming for such purpose that each Obligor conducts only
businesses, and owns only assets, that are not subject to any special
regulatory or other legal regime by reason of the type or nature of the
business conducted or the assets owned.5 1
This qualification raises at least two issues for parties interested in
ensuring that projects comply with the Equator Principles. The opinion
speaks only to "statutory laws" of the jurisdiction the opinion covers. The
various international standards for human rights and environmental
compliance with which EPFIs are concerned are not "statutory law" within
the meaning of the opinion. Also, the opinion is limited to laws that
lawyers in the issuing attorney's jurisdiction "would reasonably recognize
as being applicable to transactions of the type contemplated." A law
concerned with environmental quality, for example, would likely fall
outside of the scope of this opinion.
A non-party NGO or other group interested in implementation of the
Equator Principles could, in theory, draft a form of opinion and
50.
51.
See LEGAL OPINION LETTERS FORMBOOK, supra note 2.
Id. at 145.
1932014
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA wREVIEW
qualification that recognizes the principles-and the IFC standards-as
"law" for purposes of the opinion. The qualification would clarify that the
Equator Principles "laws" are recognized as applicable to the transaction.
If a non-party demanded that EPFIs request opinions of this form, it is
possible the EPFI may do so, leading to better diligence and compliance
with the principles. If the EPFI refused to request such an opinion, or the
issuing attorney refused to render it, that fact would be information about
the transaction that the interested non-party did not previously have. The
information may or may not indicate failure to comply with the Equator
Principles, but it is information, that could, nonetheless, be of strategic
importance.
Lawyers typically assume the underlying facts on which their legal
opinion is based. They do not do the fact-finding that underscores an
opinion; rather, they expressly rely on representations of others. Rendering
a legal opinion, however, can require clients to make factual
representations that they may otherwise avoid. Also, attorneys issuing
opinions do not (generally speaking) assume facts to be true that they know
are false.
Costs associated with issuing opinions are allocated to the company-the
client of the attorney issuing the opinion to third parties. Expanding the
scope of an opinion in response to a non-party demand raises questions of
cost allocation. In theory, if banks commit to EP III, and a corporate debtor
seeks project financing from EPFIs, then transaction costs of EP III
compliance should be priced into the transaction. However, because EP III
adoption does not create legal liabilities,5 2 parties can price EP III
compliance out of project finance transactions. The question of allocating
costs of the kind of hypothetical closing opinion presented here is a subset
of the larger question of costs of implementing EP III standards.
In short, attorneys working with non-party stakeholders could potentially
strengthen EP III implementation by creating form documentation that they
then demand EPFIs use. This approach may provide a model for other
contexts in which deal lawyers can, potentially, help to affect market
actors' level of commitment to environmental and social standards.
Of course, the ideas presented in this Symposium Article would require
significant further consideration before taking the form of any concrete
proposal or normative agenda. The purpose, here, is to reflect in new ways
on what transactional lawyers do-and what they might do.
52. See The Equator Principles, supra note 40, at 12 (providing a disclaimer to the
effect that adoption of the principles creates no liability and that implementation is
entirely voluntary).
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CONCLUSION
Transactional lawyers work at the nexus of law and markets. Many
scholars and lawmakers adhere to the view that markets necessarily
precede and outpace regulation.53 Others emphasize the continuity of legal
structure and market activity, observing that all private contracts are a
function of legal order and require the government for enforcement.54
Wherever one falls on this spectrum, deal lawyers are the ones that make
legal structure and market movements cohere.
In transactional contexts where a client expresses commitment to certain
norms, and non-parties have an interest in the company's adherence to the
norms, opinions practice could, possibly, facilitate greater compliance and
better information about compliance levels. Non-parties concerned about
the effects of transactions could gain from strategically considering
transactional lawyers' roles.
53. This view of regulation and markets we associate with Hayek. See RILES, supra
note 34, at 157-81; Scott Beaulier, Peter J. Boettke, & Christopher J. Coyne,
Knowledge, Economics, and Coordination: Understanding Hayek's Legal Theory, 1
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 209, 209-24 (2004).
54. See, e.g., R. L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLuM. L. REv.
451 (1920); Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, XV LEGAL
STuD. F. 327 (1991).
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